Youth Crime, Public Policy, and Practice in the Juvenile Justice System: Recent Trends and Needed Reforms

Author: Jeffrey M Jenson

Jenson, Jeffrey M., and Matthew O. Howard. “Youth Crime, Public Policy, and Practice in the Juvenile Justice System: Recent Trends and Needed Reforms.” Social Work, vol. 43, no. 4, July 1998, pp. 324–334. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1093/sw/43.4.324.

Historically, juvenile justice policy has oscillated between rehabilitative and punitive approaches to managing young offenders. Policy and practice in the 1970s and 1980s emphasized individual treatment for young offenders in nonsecure, community-based programs. An increase in violent youth crime during the past decade has renewed interest in punishing delinquent youths. Cyclic fluctuations in juvenile justice policy and their relationship to policy, practice, and youth crime are examined. Our analysis suggests that overall crime rates have remained relatively stable over the past three decades and are independent of prevailing juvenile justice policies. The findings support the need for targeted prevention efforts addressing the root causes of juvenile crime. Needed policy reforms, public education efforts, and practice approaches are outlined.

Key words: crime rates; delinquency; juvenile justice; social policy

Juvenile justice policy has moved to the center of public attention and political debate in recent years. Increases in youth crime, stories of frustrated parents seeking help for their troubled children, and criticisms of juvenile justice programs have led to demands for change in the way young offenders are charged, punished, and treated (Howell, Krisberg, & Jones, 1995). Public concern about violent juvenile crime is at an unprecedented high (Butterfield, 1996). The increasingly violent nature of contemporary youth crime and the escalating number of young people involved with the juvenile justice system have challenged established beliefs guiding policy and practice with offenders. Traditionally, the juvenile court has striven to maintain a balance between rehabilitating and punishing offenders. The extent to which policy with young offenders has emphasized rehabilitation versus punishment has changed intermittently over the past 30 years. Influenced by principles of deinstitutionalization, practice in the 1970s and 1980s was based on an individual treatment model encouraging placement of offenders in nonsecure, community-based programs. Since 1990 these practice strategies have been de-emphasized in favor of strict sanctions and incarceration (Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention [OJJDP], 1996).

Renewed interest in juvenile justice policy generally and in highly punitive interventive measures specifically has occurred despite evidence indicating that prevalence rates for most types of juvenile offending have remained relatively stable over the past two decades. Most crimes committed by adolescents are property offenses such as theft and vandalism (Figure 1). Rates of property offenses decreased between 1974 and 1984 and rose slowly between 1985 and 1991, but did not attain 1974 levels. Property crime arrest rates have been constant since 1992 (Snyder, 1997). Juveniles were responsible for 20 percent to 25 percent of all property offenses committed in the United States annually between 1981 and 1995 (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996; Figure 2).

The stability of property crime rates in recent years suggests that mounting public interest in juvenile justice policy is a reaction to changes in the nature of juvenile offending. The most conspicuous change in offending concerns violent crime. After more than a decade of stability, juvenile violent crime arrest rates increased 71 percent between 1987 and 1994 (Snyder, 1997). Increases in violence have been attributed to the proliferation of juvenile gangs, greater availability of handguns, and drug-related crime (Howell et al., 1995). Homicides committed by juveniles with firearms have tripled in number since 1983 (Coordinating Council on Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 1996). Incidents of gang-related violence have increased substantially since 1988 (Snyder & Sickmund, 1995). Experts estimate that there are 200,000 gang members in the largest 79 American cities (Spergel, 1995). Youth involvement in the use and distribution of illicit substances, which commonly entails carrying a weapon for purposes of protection or intimidation, has contributed to the growing violence among adolescents (Blumstein, 1995).

: Figure 1: Juvenile Arrest Rates for Property and Violent Crimes, 1973-95

The latest Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrest statistics provide some basis for optimism concerning juvenile violence. Juvenile arrests for violent crimes declined 4 percent in 1995, the first decrease in violent offending among the nation's youths since 1987 (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996). However, the 1995 arrest rate for violent offenses is 64 percent higher than the 1987 rates (Snyder, 1997).

: Figure 2: Percentage of Offenses Cleared by Arrest of Youths under 18 Years of Age, 1972-95

Juvenile courts and state youth corrections systems responsible for the control and treatment of delinquent youths have been significantly affected by increases in violent crime. Juvenile court caseloads and admissions to juvenile detention and correctional facilities reached record highs in 1994 (Snyder & Sickmund, 1995). Juvenile courts disposed 56 percent more violent cases in 1994 compared with 1988 (Butts, Snyder, & Finnegan, 1994). The National Institute of Justice (1995) predicts substantial increases in the number of youths referred to the juvenile justice system by the turn of the century.

Investigators have described previous cycles of juvenile justice reform (Bernard, 1992) and examined the impact of public policy on service delivery patterns in the justice system (Krisberg, Schwartz, Litksy, & Austin, 1986), However, the effect of juvenile justice policy on youth crime has seldom been evaluated. This article identifies significant juvenile justice policy milestones between 1970 and 1995 and examines the relationship of policy to juvenile arrest rates and rates of self-reported delinquent conduct.

Cycles of Juvenile Justice Reform

Several theorists have assessed philosophical and institutional developments in juvenile justice policy. Bernard (1992) contended that cycles consisting of a largely punitive phase of juvenile justice policy, followed by a predominantly rehabilitative phase, have been repeated three times since 1820. A policy cycle begins, Bernard argued, when the public and justice officials are convinced that juvenile crime is at an exceptionally high level. The justice system responds with severe punishments and few treatments, forcing officials to choose between harshly punishing offenders or doing nothing at all. The "forced choice" favoring punishment eventually leads to the introduction of major reform emphasizing leniency for offenders. In the final phase, juvenile crime persists but is blamed on permissive public policy, resulting in the gradual expansion of harsh treatments. Thus, the cycle begins anew.

Bernard (1992) identified the New York House of Refuge in 1825 as a starting point for subsequent cycles of reform. The House of Refuge, and the development of institutions for juveniles in Massachusetts, embodied the belief that children should be treated separately from adult offenders. However, by 1890 institutions resembled adult prisons and rehabilitation played a minor role in custodial care. A second policy cycle commenced in 1899 concurrent with the creation of the juvenile court. A separate legal process for juvenile offenders, and probation units emphasizing social casework, became integral components of a rehabilitative juvenile justice system between 1899 and 1960. Criticized as ineffective in reducing crime and chastised for denying juveniles the basic legal rights afforded adults, juvenile justice policy entered a third cycle of reform in 1960 as suggested by Bernard. This cycle was characterized by the expansion of juveniles' due process rights and lasted until the early 1970s.

Singer (1996) examined juvenile justice policy during the past two decades by analyzing effects of the 1978 New York State Juvenile Offender Act (1978 N.Y. Laws). In the late 1970s, legislators responded quickly to several highlypublicized murders committed by juveniles in New York City by increasing punitive sanctions for serious juvenile offenders. Singer suggested that these changes reflected societal and government intentions to "recrirninalize" delinquency. Recriminalization is characterized by an increase in the number of waivers to adult court and by strict punishments afforded juveniles in New York following the 1978 legislation. According to Singer, acceptance of treatment- and punishment-oriented policy reforms is contingent on prevailing political attitudes and beliefs about adolescent deviance. In the late 1970s, public opinion in New York favored a punitive response to serious youth crime and the Juvenile Offender Act reflected these sentiments.

We adopted a heuristic framework, in which juvenile justice policy is viewed as oscillating between rehabilitative and punitive models, to assess two significant periods of juvenile justice policy reform since 1970. Earlier attempts to rehabilitate juvenile offenders, including the creation of institutions for wayward youths, separation of juveniles and adults in the legal system, adoption of social casework, psychotherapy in juvenile justice practice, and expansion of juveniles1 due process rights have had significant effects on juvenile justice policy. Descriptions of these events are found in Bernard (1992), Krisberg and Austin (1993), and Singer (1996).

Milestones in Juvenile Justice Policy and Practice Since 1970

Decriminalization and Deinstitutionalization: 1970-85

Juveniles' legal rights were expanded during the 1960s to include due process considerations such as the right to counsel and protection against self-incrimination. These rights, formerly granted only in criminal justice proceedings, challenged the traditional view of the court as a wise and benevolent parent acting in the best interests of troubled youths. For the first time, juvenile court procedures began to resemble criminal justice proceedings.

A parallel movement supporting the decriminalization of delinquency also gained momentum during the 1960s and 1970s. State training schools for delinquents had become large, inefficient, and costly (Krisberg & Austin, 1993), and several investigators found institutions ineffective in reducing recidivism (for example, Martinson, 1974). Influenced by the movement to deinstitutionalize services for people with mental health problems and other disabilities (Handler & Zatz, 1982), juvenile justice policy focused on rehabilitating troubled youths in community-based programs.

The federal government recognized its role in juvenile justice policy by passing the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-415). The act promoted placement of offenders in the least restrictive appropriate treatment setting, establishment of community-based programs in place of large, custodial institutions, and diversion of youths from formal juvenile justice system processing. Several states, notably Massachusetts and Utah, closed large institutions and opened small, treatmentoriented programs in local communities (Schwartz, 1987).

Juvenile justice policies emphasizing decriminalization and deinstitutionalization were adopted by all states between 1970 and 1985. Public policy encouraged rehabilitation and individualized treatment over punishment and incarceration of offenders. Although several studies found that community-based treatment reduced recidivism and did not pose a significant threat to public safety (Coates, Miller, & Ohlin, 1982; Krisberg, Austin, Joe, & Steele, 1988), widespread application of community-based and other rehabilitative interventions was short-lived. Changes in the nature of youth crime and in the political climate during the mid-1980s signaled a return to policies of punishment and criminalization.

Punishment and Criminalization of Delinquency: 1985 to the Present

Increases in violence, youth involvement in crack cocaine use and distribution, and highly publicized incidents of gang activity led to a gradual reduction in treatment-oriented policies and Services between 1985 and 1990. Policy change was swift during the early 1990s, when several states held special legislative sessions to address youth crime. Since 1990 many states have passed legislation that has profoundly altered the way in which delinquent youths are processed in the juvenile justice system (Butterfield, 1996; Howell et al., 1995).

Contemporary juvenile justice policy stresses punishment and control of young offenders. Policies implemented since 1985 have lowered the age at which juveniles can be tried as adults, enacted stricter punishments for drug- and gang-related offenses, and introduced stringent treatments such as boot camps for all juvenile offenders (OJJDP, 1996). Community-based programs have been eliminated in many jurisdictions, and institutions combining different types of juvenile offenders have been reintroduced.

Punitive policies directed at juvenile offenders have yielded mixed results. Legislation enabling states to transfer more juveniles to the criminal justice system has had negligible effects on youths' violent crime rates (Singer, 1996). Evaluations of boot camps designed to teach juveniles discipline and the value of hard work have been inconclusive (Jones, 1996).

Modeling and Measuring the Relationship between Public Policy and Youth Crime

The relationship between public policy and delinquent conduct can be viewed in at least two ways. One perspective is that rates of youth crime are largely (or wholly) independent of public policy. Advocates of this position consider the relatively stable rates of juvenile offending evidence that public policy has not addressed salient causes of youth crime including poverty, limited educational and occupational opportunities, and other widespread social maladies. Other theorists contend that public policy is causally related to juvenile offending. Youth crime rates rise or fall, proponents of this view argue, depending on the effectiveness of prevailing juvenile justice policy in preventing and controlling delinquency. This article highlights the complexities involved in attempting to draw conclusions about causal associations between the prevalence of youth crime and public policy by examining official arrest records and rates of self-reported delinquency between 1973 and 1995.

Crimes against property and crimes against persons between 1973 and 1995 were evaluated using arrest records compiled by the FBI's Uniform Crime Reports (U.S. Department of Justice, 1996). Property crimes included burglary, larceny, theft, and motor vehicle theft. Crimes against persons included murder, nonnegligent manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, and aggravated assault.

Official arrest data underestimate the actual amount of juvenile crime because many delinquent acts are undetected and therefore do not result in arrest (Snyder & Sickmund, 1995). Indicators of self-reported property and person crimes were also examined. These data are derived from the Monitoring the Future Study (Johnston, O'Malley, & Bachman, 1996), an annual assessment of alcohol use, drug use, and delinquency in a random sample of approximately 16,000 of the nation's public school students. In-school surveys of nationally representative samples of high school seniors have been conducted since 1975; self-reported delinquency has been assessed since 1983.

: Figure 3: High School Seniors Reporting Involvement in Selected Delinquent Activities in Past 12 Months, 1983-95

Property crime was assessed with two questions: Students were asked if they had "taken something not belonging to you worth over $50" in the past 12 months and if they had "gone into some house or building when you weren't supposed to be there." Person crimes were assessed by asking students if they had been involved "in a fight where a group of your friends were against another group" and whether they "used a knife or gun or some other thing to get something from a person" in the past 12 months. Response options for all four items ranged from 1 = not at all to 4 = five or more times. Responses were dichotomized (0 = no, 1 = yes) and are presented as proportions in Figure 3.

Trends in Juvenile Offending: 1972-95

Self-Reported Delinquency between 1983 and 1995

The percentages of high school seniors entering a house or building without permission (23 percent) and taking something worth more than $50 (6 percent) were at their lowest points in 1983. By 1987, 27 percent of the students surveyed had illegally entered a residence or building and 9 percent had taken something worth more than $50. Rates of illegal entry decreased after 1987, and in 1995, 24 percent of seniors entered a house or building without permission. Theft of $50 or more increased after 1987, and by 1993, 11 percent of seniors reported stealing something in excess of $50. In general, self-reported rates of trespassing and theft were stable between 1983 and 1995. Between 1983 and 1995, between 18 percent and 22 percent of seniors reported fighting in the previous year. A small percentage of seniors used knives or guns in each of the 13 years examined (for example, 3 percent in 1983, 4 percent in 1995).

Arrests Attributed to Juveniles between 1973 and 1995

Juveniles accounted for 36 percent of all property offenses cleared by arrests in 1974 (Figure 2), The percentage of property crimes attributed to youths under 18 years declined thereafter, reaching a low in 1989, when adolescents accounted for 20 percent of all property offenses committed nationally. The proportion of property offenses attributed to juveniles increased slowly between 1989 and 1995.

Adolescents accounted for 9 percent to 14 percent of violent crimes annually in the United States between 1973 and 1995. The proportion of violent crimes attributed to juveniles decreased slowly between 1972 and 1987. Between 1988 and 1994, juveniles accounted for an increasing percentage of all violent offenses. The proportion of all violent offenses committed by juveniles in 1994 (14.2 percent) differed little from the comparable 1972 figure (13.2 percent). The percentage of violent juvenile crime attributed to juveniles in 1995 (14.1 percent) decreased for the first time since 1987.

Arrest Rates for Property and Violent Crimes between 1972 and 1995

The percentage of all arrests for crimes committed by juveniles may not accurately reflect trends in juvenile offending if rates of adult arrest vary widely over time. Therefore, to fully understand trends in the prevalence of juvenile offending, it is necessary to examine arrest rates for youths independently of adult arrest rates. Arrest rates for property and violent crimes committed by juveniles between 1973 and 1995 are shown in Figure 1.

Arrests for property crimes fell 29 percent between 1974 and 1983. In 1974 nearly 3 percent of young people between ages 10 and 17 were arrested for a property crime. Approximately 2.3 percent of similarly aged youths were arrested for a property offense in 1983. Property arrests increased slowly in the years after 1983 (Snyder & Sickmund, 1995).

Between 300 and 350 of every 100,000 adolescents were arrested for violent crimes annually between 1974 and 1988. The relatively constant violent crime rate changed in 1988. Arrests for violent crimes increased more than 70 percent between 1988 and 1995. In 1994 and 1995 approximately 500 arrests were made for every 100,000 juveniles in the United States. Violent crime arrests decreased by 4 percent in 1995. The decline in violent crime was highest for younger juveniles; youths under age 15 accounted for 55 percent of the decrease in violent offending between 1994 and 1995. The number of adolescents arrested for murder declined 14 percent between 1994 and 1995.

Implications for Practice: Reforming Juvenile Justice Policy

General indicators of juvenile offending suggest that it declined between 1972 and 1995 following the introduction of policies emphasizing decriminalization and deinstitutionalization. Arrest rates for property crimes fell 29 percent between 1974 and 1983 as diversion strategies and rehabilitation programs were implemented (Snyder & Sickmund, 1995). Property crime increased 11 percent between 1983 and 1992. Violent crime arrest rates did not change significantly between 1973 and 1983 but increased 57 percent between 1983 and 1992, concurrent with the introduction of punishment-oriented reforms. The number of self-reported property and person offenses committed by high school seniors was stable between 1983 and 1995.

Some readers might surmise, on the basis of these findings, that policy and practice emphasizing rehabilitation is more effective than punishment-oriented policy in controlling youth crime. However, a number of factors complicate efforts to elucidate causal connections between youth crime and public policy. Juvenile justice policy is designed and implemented by local and state governments. Jurisdictions vary considerably in their responses to youth crime and did not simultaneously shift to punishment-oriented policies in 1985, the date recognized in this study. Aggregate data do not capture differences in the nature and timing of policy and practice modifications at the local or state level. In addition, there is frequently a lag between passage, implementation, and evaluation of a new policy. Furthermore, it is possible that broad demographic, economic, and sociopolitical developments codetermine rates of juvenile offending and societal responses to such offending, thereby leading to specious conclusions about the relationship of policy to juvenile crime rates. Perhaps the most obvious aspect of juvenile crime rates over the preceding two decades is their stability. This stability suggests a multiply determined etiologic process that largely has remained unaffected by juvenile justice practice and policy approaches.

Empirical evidence pertaining to the relationship between policy and crime is limited and does not account for demographic, social, and political factors that are associated with fluctuations in juvenile crime. Delinquency remains a serious social problem because policies do not target underlying causes of antisocial behavior such as poverty, unemployment, inadequate family support, and limited educational opportunities. Policy oscillates between competing philosophies about the best way to intervene with young offenders. However, neither treatment- nor punishment-oriented policies target fundamental causes of juvenile crime. Rather, programs and services for juvenile offenders and their families focus on applying consequences and finding immediate solutions to crises precipitated by extensive histories of delinquency and antisocial behavior.

Future policies should balance principles of rehabilitation and accountability and include practice strategies that target established causes of antisocial behavior. These recommendations are consistent with solutions posed by other investigators (Bazemore & Day, 1996; Wilson & Howell, 1995), who recognized that rehabilitation and individual accountability are essential components of the juvenile justice system.

Conclusion

Broad measures to reduce the number of youths referred to the juvenile justice system should be implemented. We know much about the social conditions that place youths at risk of delinquency. These conditions include poverty, lack of family stability, antisocial peer influences, low interest in school, and substance abuse (Jenson, I997a; Williams, Ayers, & Arthur, 1997). Communities can prevent delinquency by designing programs that address known risk factors for antisocial behavior. Hawkins and Catalano (1992) described planning and implementation steps necessary to develop community-based, risk-focused delinquency prevention programs. Evaluations of interventions based on this approach reveal improvements in school performance, increases in parent involvement, and reductions in delinquent behavior (Brewer, Hawkins, Catalano, & Neckerman, 1995; Jenson, 1997b).

Economic development efforts in high-risk neighborhoods should also be encouraged to reduce poverty, provide opportunities for young people, and foster cooperation among community members.

Elected officials and practitioners should aim to promote stability and balance in juvenile justice policy. Numerous factors contribute to a young person's decision to engage in crime, and members of the community share the responsibility for addressing these factors. It is unrealistic to think that changes in the juvenile justice system will solve the crime problem among the nation's young people. Many states passed new policies and service delivery strategies during the past five years, and the consequences of these changes are unknown. States should consider a moratorium on juvenile justice legislation until investigations are conducted to examine the effects of policy changes on crime rates and recidivism.

The National Council on Crime and Delinquency and OJJDP have called for graduated sanctions as a method of ensuring a balanced juvenile justice system (Krisberg, Currie, Onek, £ Wiebush, 1995; Wilson & Howell, 1995). Graduated sanctions require matching offenders to appropriate punishments and treatments on the basis of offending history and individual needs. This approach is consistent with the founding philosophy of the juvenile court and deserves greater policy consideration. Social workers could perform pivotal roles in improving assessment and matching strategies in juvenile justice. Social work's emphasis on the role of contextual factors in delinquency causation is needed to improve the fit between treatments and characteristics of troubled youths.

Juvenile justice policy reform should not be solely determined by the characteristics of a relatively small number of violent and chronic offenders. Most delinquent youths are property offenders who never commit crimes against persons. Unfortunately, many states have introduced policy reforms based only on the characteristics of violent juveniles. These reforms allow strict punishment for violent offenders but often ignore the needs of most adolescents referred to the juvenile justice system.

Effective treatments for serious offenders and violent youths should be developed, tested, and disseminated. Although they constitute only a small proportion of delinquents, violent offenders consume a disproportionate share of resources in the juvenile justice system. Little is known about the effectiveness of interventions to rehabilitate violent youths. One promising approach to rehabilitating serious and violent offenders is multisystemic therapy (Henggeler, Melton, & Smith, 1992). This intervention is based on the assumption that adolescent behavior is nested in complex and interconnected systems involving individual, peer, family, school, and community factors. The program includes family- and home-based treatments that focus on improving the decision-making skills of serious juvenile offenders. Controlled outcome studies reveal significant reductions in delinquency among adolescents participating in the program (Henggeler et al., 1992; Henggeler et al., 1993). Interventions that address known characteristics of violent offenders and strategies that reduce the flow, and limit the supply, of handguns should also be evaluated.

The public should be educated about the etiology and prevalence of youth crime. Contrary to media portrayals and public opinion, juvenile homicide is not widespread. In 1994 four cities — Los Angeles, New York, Chicago, and Detroit — accounted for one-third of all homicide arrests and most (92 percent) counties had one or fewer juvenile homicide offenders (Snyder, Sickmund, & Poe-Yamagata, 1996). Fewer than 1 percent of all young people in the United States were arrested for a violent crime in 1995 (Snyder, 1997). Education is also needed to stimulate greater awareness of the problems and needs of African American, Hispanic, Asian American, Native American, and other youths of color. Youths from ethnic minority groups are over represented in the juvenile justice system, and studies show that rates of disparity for these youths increase as the system becomes more punitive (Pope & Feyerherm, 1993). One promising approach to reducing juvenile justice involvement among African American boys is "identity development" (Tolan & Guerra, 1994). Identity development programs provide Afrocentric moral education and fellowship to establish antiviolence beliefs and increase self-esteem among young African Americans. Several programs include mentoring from prosocial adults to combat stereotypes of crime and violence. Additional strategies are needed to reduce the disproportionate representation of ethnic minority youths in the juvenile justice system.

The strength of the juvenile justice system lies in its ability to balance policies of prevention, rehabilitation, and punishment. History suggests that reform based on any one of these policies is ineffective. The needs of all troubled youths should be considered as policy changes in the juvenile justice system are debated. Social workers should be a strong voice in this debate.

An earlier version of this article was presented at the Annual Program Meeting of the Council on Social Work Education, March 1997, Chicago.

Original manuscript received June 18, 1997

Final revision received November 19,1997

Accepted December 12, 1997

© 1998 National Association of Social Workers, Inc.

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By Jeffrey M. Jenson and Matthew O. Howard

Jeffrey M. Jenson, PhD, is associate professor, School of Social Work, University of Iowa, 308 North Hall, Iowa City, IA 52242-1223.

Matthew O. Howard, PhD, is assistant professor, George Warren Brown School of Social Work, Washington University, St. Louis.

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