The 'Secularization' of Utah and Religious Competition

Author: Phillips, Rick

Phillips, Rick. “The ‘Secularization’ of Utah and Religious Competition.” Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, vol. 38, no. 1, 1999, pp. 72–82. JSTOR, https://doi.org/10.2307/1387585.

A "supply-side" theory of religion claims that ties between church and state inhibit religious mobilization. The theory also asserts that the weakening of church-state ties is the inevitable harbinger of broad religious pluralism. This paper investigates these claims using the relationship between the state of Utah and the Church &Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the "LDS" or Mormon church) as a case study. Data demonstrate that the loosening of church-state ties in early Utah coincides with rising rates of religious activity and the emergence of religious pluralism, as supply-side theory predicts. However, these incipient trends were swiftly curtailed by renewed growth within Mormonism, which rebuts the theory's claims. The paper presents several reasons why Mormonism was able to circumvent the predicted effects of religious competition in Utah, and offers these as caveats for supply-side theory.

A number of influential works in the sociology of religion hold that the separation of church and state is a hallmark of secularization and precipitates declines in church vitality (e.g., Berger 1967). However, this traditional view is challenged by a controversial theory of religious mobilization based on principles of supply-side economics. This "supply-side theory" asserts that the merger of church and state impedes religious mobilization, and that state supported churches meet relatively few of their members' religious needs. This paper outlines supply-side theory's claims and assesses them with historical and statistical data describing church growth and decline in Utah since 1847.

Supply-side theory employs economic metaphors to describe the dynamics of religious mobilization. The theory assumes that "demand" for religion is present in all societies (Finke 1997). Religious organizations, or "firms" attempt to meet this demand by offering valued rewards (e.g., solidarity and meaning) to potential members in exchange for adherence (Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone 1995). The theory further assumes that because societies encompass various social classes, age cohorts and interest groups, different people have different religious demands, depending, in part, on social location. According to the theory, these diverse "consumers" are best mobilized when a number of religious firms are free to specialize and compete for distinct "market segments" (Finke, Guest, and Stark 1996). The more firms active in a "religious economy" (until market saturation is achieved [Stark and Bainbridge 1997: 103]) the broader the spectrum of satisfied demand, and hence the higher the overall level of religious mobilization. Competition between firms also ensures that each will be closely attentive to members' demands, because adherents are free to switch and affiliate with the firm that best suits them in this setting (Stark 1997).

Conversely, since no single firm can simultaneously cater to the disparate needs of every market segment, when religious markets are served by a "monopoly firm" substantial religious demand goes unmet. Given this, monopoly firms must always safeguard their "market share" by strictly regulating the religious economy, since segments with unmet needs are receptive to insurgent cults and sects (Stark and Iannaccone 1994). Regulation is usually achieved by a merger of church and state which legally restricts competing firms, and/or prohibits dissent. However, should a monopoly firm's state support wane or withdraw, competitors will shortly appear and defections from the monopoly firm will increase. Thus, "wherever and whenever state repression of religious competition falters, pluralism will emerge" (Finke, Guest, and Stark 1996: 206). Once religious markets are free from regulation, nascent religious pluralism will advance toward "market equilibrium," or the absence of large market share firms (Stark and Iannaccone 1994).

In sum, supply-side theory makes three key claims about the effect of state regulation on religious mobilization: (1) State monopoly churches inhibit religious mobilization since they cannot meet the needs of every market segment. (2) The weakening of church-state ties results in nascent religious pluralism and/or schism within the monopoly church. (3) Sustained religious freedom eventually supplants large market share churches with numerous specialized competitors.

The following sections examine these three claims using the relationship between the state of Utah and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the "LDS" or Mormon church) as a case study. This case is ideal for investigating supply-side theory's claims, because nineteenth-century Mormonism was a de facto state church in the Intermountain West, but state rule was sacrificed for Utah's admission to the Union, and formal church-state ties have weakened ever since (Alexander 1986).

Supply-side theory asserts that state monopoly churches do not meet enough religious demand to ensure the loyalty of every segment of society. To ward off schism and apostasy, these churches must restrict competition and/or prohibit dissent. However, once these regulations are established, the monopoly church no longer depends solely on members' allegiance to exist, and hence there is little incentive for the firm to attend to disfranchised segments (Stark 1997). Thus, the theory predicts that rates of formal church participation within state monopoly firms will be low.

Mormon Theocracy and Market Regulation

Mormonism in Utah began as a separatist theocracy. Invested with political, judicial, and ecclesiastical authority, Brigham Young and the Mormon hierarchy managed both the spiritual and temporal affairs of Mormon pioneers in Salt Lake City. This fusion of religious and secular power ensconced Mormonism as the de facto state church of the Utah Territory (Shipps 1985).

Examples of the commingling of church and state in early Utah abound. For instance, legislators and community officials in Utah drew from the ranks of church leaders, and most of these were nominated by the Mormon hierarchy and "elected" unopposed (Alexander and Allen 1984). Moreover, local bishops(n1) were responsible for managing community water rights -- a weighty stewardship in the arid Great Basin (Sadler and Roberts 1984). Bishops also controlled an ecclesiastical court system that settled both church and community disputes. Bishop's courts could levy fines, and impose liens on property (Firmage and Mangrum 1988).

During the "consecration movement" of the 1850s, Brigham Young enjoined Mormon settlers to deed their land and belongings to the church to demonstrate faithfulness and commitment (Arrington, Fox, and May 1976). Compliant Mormons continued to live on their land and control their possessions, but deeded property was to remain with the church if members apostatized. Thus, disaffected Mormons with consecrated property could either endure within the church, or leave penniless.(n2)

Mormons were also admonished from the pulpit to eschew interaction (especially commerce) with non-Mormons. Further, between 1854-1857, fiery sermons from church leaders threatened apostates with harm or even death if they did not reform or leave the territory (Peterson 1989:61). This made leaving Mormonism costly for disgruntled members, and the absence of religious freedom suppressed the emergence of religious pluralism in early Utah. Even schisms and heresies within Mormonism -- an otherwise ubiquitous feature of Mormon society -- were largely absent in Utah between 1846 and 1857 (Shields 1990). Given such pervasive church-state ties, supply-side theory would predict low rates of religious mobilization among Utah Mormons. Extant data suggest that this is indeed the case.

Church Activity in Early Utah

While the power and scope of Mormon theocracy crested in the mid 1850s, there is ample evidence -- consistent with supply-side theory -- that formal church participation among rank-and-file Mormons was weak. From 1854 to 1857, the highest echelons of church leadership conducted the well-documented "Mormon reformation" to counteract concern over growing numbers of Mormons remiss in meeting church obligations (Peterson 1989). During the reformation, church leaders visited Mormon settlements and chastised members for neglecting ecclesiastical duties, defiling the Sabbath, ignoring church dietary restrictions, and skipping church meetings (Sessions 1982). Leaders deemed commitment so low that the practice of rebaptizing church members for the remission of sins was widespread (Kimball 1981). Moreover, Brigham Young's attempts to convince his followers to join the consecration movement -- concurrent with the Mormon reformation -- belies the fact that less than half of them ever did so (Arrington, Fox, and May 1976).

Fluctuations in LDS church attendance rates also support the notion that church-state ties weakened religious mobilization in Utah. Indeed, the dismantling of Mormon theocracy and the assimilation of Mormonism into American society in the twentieth-century (detailed in the following section) is synchronous with increases in the rate of Mormon church attendance. For instance, at the turn of the twentieth-century, Alexander (1986: 108) notes that "attendance at ward [parish] services was very low by today's standards, generally under 15%, especially in the smaller, highly Mormon towns." But as Mormonism disengaged from Utah politics and began to resemble a denomination more than a government, this rate began to climb. For example, Arrington and Bitton (1979: 285) report that about 35% of Mormons attended church weekly before World War II, but by the 1970s -- when Mormonism was emerging as a bona fide international faith -- weekly attendance stood at 48% (see also Cowan 1985:69). Finally, a sample of Mormons in the Intermountain West from 1987-1996 shows that 69.5% attend church weekly (Phillips 1998).

Thus, the waning power of Mormon theocracy accompanied increasing rates of religious mobilization, as supply-side theory predicts. This finding is consistent with other tests of the theory as well. For instance, Finke and Stark (1992) report very low church membership rates in regions of the antebellum republic with state sanctioned churches. In contemporary Sweden, Hamberg, and Petterson (1995) show that church attendance rates within the state subsidized Lutheran church are extremely low -- paling in comparison to the minority churches braving Sweden's heavily regulated religious market. Stark (1997) demonstrates that low rates of religious mobilization in West Germany are likely due to state support for Lutheranism and Catholicism. Finally, two cross-national analyses find that church-state ties negatively affect rates of religious mobilization in Western nations (Chaves and Cann 1992; Verweij, Ester, and Nauta 1997).

In addition to claims about the effect of church-state ties on religious participation, supply-side theory also asserts that when state monopoly churches lose their power to regulate the religious marketplace, competing firms will emerge and defection from the monopoly church will increase (Finke 1997). There is empirical support for this claim. For example, historians of the antebellum U.S. agree that the weakening of New England's Protestant establishment resulted in religious dissent and pluralism in the region (see Finke and Stark 1992; Hatch 1989). Finke (1997) describes how the disestablishment of Shintoism in postwar Japan prompted a rapid influx of competing religions, and the emergence of religious freedom in Eastern Europe coincides with the proliferation of new religious movements in these nations as well. This same dynamic is observed in early Utah.

The Americanization of Mormonism

Mormon theocracy and isolation in Utah was short-lived. Conflict with the federal government, commencing less than a decade after Salt Lake City's founding, began dissolving Mormonism's secular power (Shipps, May, and May 1994). In 1857, President James Buchanan responded to Mormon separatism and presumed insurrection by sending U.S. Army troops to occupy the Salt Lake Valley and enforce territorial laws. Buchanan also removed Brigham Young as territorial governor in 1858 and replaced him with a non-Mormon appointee (Bailey 1978). Moreover, the scope and power of Mormon ecclesiastical courts was drastically curtailed by Congress in 1874 (Quinn 1997).

Toward the end of the century, federal antipolygamy laws disfranchised the church, seized its assets, and authorized warrants for the arrest of Mormon leaders. Most of the church hierarchy was forced into hiding to avoid arrest, and church finances fell into perilous disarray (Alexander 1991). While "plural marriage" served to stir up public support for anti-Mormon legislation, leading historians of Mormonism agree that the lingering fusion of church and state, as much as polygamy, provoked firm opposition from Washington (see Alexander 1986; Shipps 1985; Hansen 1981).

In 1890, facing considerable political and economic pressure, Mormon leaders removed remaining church-state ties in Utah, disavowed polygamy, and dismantled their political party. (Mormon bloc voting was particularly galling to non-Mormons in the territory [Arrington and Bitton 1979].) Mormonism's surrender to federal rule is epitomized by the 1890 "Manifesto," a public statement of the church's intent to obey the United States government and assimilate into the American mainstream. The Manifesto paved the way for Utah's admission into the Union in 1896, and was subsequently canonized into Mormon scripture (Alexander 1986).

After the Manifesto, the Mormon hierarchy inaugurated a program of sustained, purposeful transformation from a separatist sect to a conventional Christian faith (Mauss 1994; Alexander 1986). Indeed, the "Americanization" of Mormonism is a central theme in the burgeoning historiography of the church (Howe 1997). Arrington and Bitton (1979: 251) write that by the turn of the century "the church was, in effect, reoriented to incorporate the standards of social, political and economic behavior imposed by American society." And Alexander (1986:3) concludes that "by 1930, that transition had largely been completed."

The dismantling of Mormon theocracy opened the door for competing churches in Utah. The Episcopal and Baptist churches arrived in the territory in 1867, the Methodists followed in 1869, the Presbyterians in 1870, and the Congregationalists in 1874 (Bean, Mineau, and Anderton 1990).

In 1875, Utah's first Catholic priest wrote to the archbishop in San Francisco expressing his belief that prospects for winning converts to Catholicism in the territory were excellent. Assessing the Utah territory as a "wide and fruitful field for Catholic operation," he writes:

I wish to call your attention to the necessity of building a church in Ogden City? This is and always will be a city of importance, and consequently, its Catholic interests and wants should be attended as soon as possible. The number of Catholics there is increasing and would increase more rapidly if there were a Catholic church (edited in Weber 1976: 144-45).

Thus, by the time the manifesto was issued in 1890, religious pluralism already had a firm foothold in Utah. In that year, the census of religious bodies reported that Protestants in Salt Lake City enjoyed a 9.1% share of the city's church members; Catholics had a slightly smaller 7.7% share. By the 1906 religious census, however, Protestants had increased their presence in Salt Lake to 13.4% of the city's total adherents, while the Catholics more than doubled their ranks to 16.3% (Christiano 1987: 174). The Mormon share of Salt Lake City's religious market fell from 82% to 70% between the censuses. Mormonism's statewide market share losses were more dramatic (Bean, Mineau, and Anderton 1990). While these data must be interpreted with caution -- good information on birth rates and migration patterns in and out of Utah are lacking -- they are consistent with supply-side theory's claim that the weakening of church-state ties facilitates the emergence of religious pluralism and competition.

Supply-side theory predicts that sustained religious freedom will eventually supplant large market share churches with numerous specialized competitors (Stark, Finke, and Iannaccone 1995). Advocates of the theory point to the United States' religious economy since the disestablishment of Protestantism in the nineteenth-century to bolster this claim (Finke and Stark 1992). New religious movements still proliferate in the U.S., and the market shares of more entrenched churches wax and wane according to identifiable market forces (Iannaccone, Olson, and Stark 1995). Nevertheless, several tests of supply-side theory report findings that temper the strength of this claim. For instance, an analysis of U.S. counties from 1860-1930 finds that conservative churches -- which had high overall growth rates compared to ecumenical denominations -- increased their market share most dramatically in counties where they already enjoyed numerical dominance (Blau, Redding, and Land 1993). Olson (1997) closely corroborates these findings in a study of U.S. counties from 1980-1990. The case of Catholic Ireland is also a problem for supply-side theory. Catholicism maintains a putative monopoly in Ireland, even though church-state ties in Ireland are less pervasive than in many other Western nations (Chaves and Cann 1992).

In short, the claim that market equilibrium is an inevitability in free religious markets meets with mixed results. For this claim to hold in Utah, Mormonism -- still the state's dominant firm in 1906 -- should continue to lose market share well into the twentieth-century. But did this happen?

Resurgent Mormon Market Share

Data show that the gains posted by Catholic and Protestant churches in post-Manifesto Utah did not proceed apace, and it is likely that their share of Utah's religious market peaked before 1920 -- even as the assimilation of Mormonism accelerated (see Mauss 1994). Indeed, while deregulation was the bane of Mormon theocracy in Utah, the consequent dip in per capita membership was only temporary. Shortly after the initial post-Manifesto slump, Mormonism regained and expanded its market share. As the century progressed, the church posted gains in per capita membership in Utah for each successive decade -- growing from 61% of Utahns in 1910 to approximately 75% today (1997-98 Church Almanac 1997). Moreover, Table 1 reveals that this net increase occurred even in urban places and transportation centers most amenable to religious competition and pluralism. Utah's three largest cities (Salt Lake City, Ogden, and Provo) all show persistent gains in per capita Mormons from 1920 to at least 1970 (which is as far as available data go) (1975 Church Almanac 1975: E7-E8).

Today, some Utah counties exceed 80% Mormon, and no competing church has more than a 6% market share in the state (Young 1996; Kosmin and Lachman 1993). This accrual is not solely due to high birthrates among Mormons: the LDS church's two proselytizing missions in Utah obtain more new converts for the church than any other mission in the United States or Canada (Barber 1995).

In sum, the claim that free religious markets necessarily move toward market equilibrium is inconsistent with the dynamics of LDS church growth in post-Manifesto Utah. While a waning Mormon theocracy in Utah gave way to nascent religious pluralism, by 1920 the membership gains of competing firms were reversed by renewed growth within Mormonism. This suggests -- consistent with Olson (1997) and Blau, Redding, and Land (1993) -- that market share for dominant religious firms does not necessarily shrink in unregulated markets, and may in fact grow. This point receives detailed treatment below.

Data describing Utah's religious economy support supply-side theory's claim that state sponsored churches elicit low levels of religious mobilization. These data also demonstrate that the weakening of church-state ties is the harbinger of religious competition and pluralism, as the theory predicts. However, this paper shows that the decline of Mormon theocracy neither impelled Utah's religious economy toward market equilibrium, nor permanently reduced Mormonism's market share in the state. These discrepancies suggest factors can moderate the predicted effects of religious competition in free religious markets. I argue that three such factors insulated twentieth-century Mormonism from defections and promoted LDS church growth in Utah despite the separation of church and state: (1) pervasive religious endogamy, (2) denominational distinctiveness, and (3) high birth rates. I consider each of these, and their implications for supply-side theory, below.

Religious Endogamy

The LDS church prescribes religious endogamy for church members. Indeed, exogamous couples cannot marry in a Mormon temple -- a sine qua non for admission to the highest realms of Mormon heaven (Burton 1994). Since Mormon injunctions against exogamy are stricter than those of most competing firms, the odds are good that interfaith dating relationships involving Mormons will either dissolve before marriage, or stimulate conversion of the non-LDS partner. Conversion to marry a Mormon is a common source of new converts for the church (Phillips 1996). Thus, the LDS church's strict demand for religious endogamy ensures that the church gains more converts than loses members from interfaith courtships. This is particularly true in Utah, where a large Mormon majority puts daunting constraints on the marriage market for single, non-LDS people (Smith and Shipman 1996).

In addition, religious endogamy deters intergenerational religious switching. Studies show that children raised in single-faith families are less likely than mixed-faith peers to change denominations or apostatize (Sherkat 1991; Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990). This deterrent protects LDS market share more in Utah than elsewhere in the nation, since Utah Mormons are at least three times more likely than other U.S. Mormons to be married within the faith (Ludlow 1992: 1532).

Insistence on religious endogamy allows the LDS church to secure new converts and retain children born in the faith -- particularly in Utah, where Mormon endogamy is pervasive. It follows, then, that the stricter a dominant firm's insistence on religious endogamy, the lower the impact of religious competition on that firm's market share.

Denominational Distinctiveness

Studies show that religious switching is most likely between denominations resembling one another in polity, theology, and ritual (Sherkat and Wilson 1995; Iannaccone 1990). Sullins (1993: 416), for instance, finds that people switching between Protestant denominations "attempt to maximize the perceived rewards of a move to a new religious tradition while minimizing the `costs' of that move in terms of difference from the tradition of origin." Hence, religions with distinct polities, theologies and rituals lose few adherents from religious switching (Sherkat 1997; Bainbridge 1997; Iannaccone 1990). For example, the Catholic church retains 85.2% of its U.S. membership, while Judaism retains 86.8% (Sullins 1993; Iannaccone 1990). Conversely, moderate Protestant groups -- which are not far distant from their liberal or conservative counterparts -- retain 75.2% of their members (Sullins 1993).

The LDS church is distinctive in polity, theology and ritual. Indeed, some scholars describe Mormonism as a new world religion: a departure from mainstream Christianity as pronounced as the Christian departure from Judaism (Shipps 1985; Stark 1984). Mormon theology differs markedly from other Christian theologies (McMurrin 1965), and Mormons do not consider themselves Protestants (Johnson and Mullins 1992). Consequently, the LDS church retains members in the U.S. as successfully as Catholicism or Judaism (Sandomirsky and Wilson 1990). In short, the more distinctive a dominant religious firm in polity, theology and ritual, the lower the impact of religious competition on that firm's market share.

Birth Rates

While religious switching is not uncommon, most people retain their original church affiliation (Sherkat 1997; Iannaccone 1990). Even liberal Protestant groups -- which suffer most from apostasy and desertion -- retain the majority of their members (Sullins 1993). Thus, children born in the faith are an asset for religious firms seeking to maintain or increase market share. The LDS church encourages large families (Heaton 1988) and profits greatly from children born in the faith. Mormon birth rates and family size exceed those of most other churches, and far outstrip the U.S. average (Heaton 1996; Heaton, Goodman, and Holman 1994). Moreover, highly religious Mormons have more children than other Mormons (Ludlow 1992: 1522), ensuring that the families most likely to provide a religious socialization that deters apostasy and religious switching are also those with the most offspring.

High birth rates contribute to Mormon market share in Utah more than in the rest of the nation, since Mormons in Utah have more children than Mormons elsewhere (Heaton 1986). Indeed, a full 75% of Utah's rapid population growth since 1970 comes from natural increase m most of this within Mormonism (Perlich 1996; Heaton 1996). These data suggest that the higher the rate of natural increase within a dominant firm, the lower the impact of religious competition on that firm's market share.

Mormon Consumer Preferences

The effects of endogamy, distinctiveness and high fertility outlined above can mitigate or avert the predicted effects of religious freedom and competition on large market share firms. Indeed, these three factors often reinforce and amplify one another. For example, within Mormonism, the church's requirements for endogamy and large families ensure that parents collaborate to socialize many offspring into a distinctive faith. Once raised, these children tend to marry within the church and produce large families of their own, restarting the cycle. This is especially evident in Utah, where Mormon endogamy is pervasive, and birth rates are high. Thus, the LDS church fends off competitors and preserves its dominance in Utah by molding the preferences of religious consumers both within and between generations (Sherkat 1997: 67; Sherkat and Wilson 1995:1017).

These market share safeguards also explain why other, similar religious firms are able to hold or expand their market share in free religious markets. Recall that Olson (1997) and Blau, Redding, and Land (1993) found that conservative churches in the U.S. tend to expand in settings where they are already numerically dominant. Conservative churches are more likely than their ecumenical counterparts to be endogamous, distinctive and fecund, thus averting the otherwise erosive effects of religious competition on their large market shares. Moreover, starting with sufficient numbers within a given market provides members of conservative churches with access to marriage partners within the faith, and normative support for unique religious practices and high fertility. As with Mormonism in Utah, this circumscribes religious demand and makes it unlikely that members of these churches will see competitors as viable religious options (see Ellison and Sherkat 1995). This also explains why Catholicism continues to flourish in Ireland despite a relatively free religious market.

In sum, this paper demonstrates that some religious firms in unregulated markets not only seek to meet demand, they seek to shape demand as well. I argue that insistence on endogamy, denominational distinctiveness, and promoting high fertility are the principal ways some churches accomplish this aim. Considering these factors (and others yet to be identified) in future tests of supply-side theory will help scholars more accurately determine the effect of religious competition on church growth and decline, particularly within free religious markets.

NOTES

Research for this paper was funded by grants from the Religious Research Association, the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, and the Rutgers Center for Historical Analysis. Wayne Brekhus, John L. Martin, Julie McLaughlin, Chaim Waxman, Benjamin Zablocki, and two anonymous reviewers commented on earlier drafts of this work.

(n1) Bishop is the highest office in a Mormon congregation. In early Utah, the office of bishop was as much a political as an ecclesiastical appointment (Shipps, May, and May 1994).

(n2) In fact, the legality of these deeds under U.S. territorial law is debatable, and there is no evidence of actual escheats based on the deeds. There is little doubt, however, that Mormons consecrating their possessions believed that the deeds were irrevocable (Arrington, Fox, and May 1976).

(n3) Ogden lies 35 miles north of Salt Lake City, and was the Utah Territory's major railroad center.

  
  
  




  
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  B - 1920
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  Utah               60.5    60.9    64.8    68.3    71.3    71.5
  





  







  


    

      
        
      
      
        
      
    

    
      
      

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  Salt Lake City     45.8    47.7    52.0    61.6    66.3    66.4
  





  







  


    

      
        
      
      
        
      
    

    
      
      

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  Ogden              59.0    61.5    66.0    68.1    67.1    68.1
  





  







  


    

      
        
      
      
        
      
    

    
      
      

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  Provo              75.0    71.2    73.6    76.3    86.5    87.6
  





  







  


    

      
        
      
      
        
      
    

    
      
      

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  [*] Data from Deseret News 1975 Church Almanac, E7-ES.
  





  







  


    

      
        
      
      
        
      
    

    
      
      

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